Many works in the past showed that human judgments of uncertainty do not conform very well to Probability Theory. The present paper reports four experiments that were conducted in order to evaluate if human judgments of uncertainty conform better to Possibility Theory. At first, two experiments investigate the descriptive properties of some basic possibilistic measures. Then a new measurement apparatus is used, the Ψ-scale, to compare possibilistic vs. probabilistic disjunction and conjunction. Results strongly suggest that a human judgment is qualitative in essence, closer to a possibilistic than to a probabilistic approach of uncertainly. The paper also describes a qualitative heuristic, for conjunction, that was used by expert radiologists.
Introduction
For a lot of practical reasons (e.g., improving man-machine interfaces, designing decision support systems, and so on), it is of primary importance to be able to relate descriptive models of human judgments to normative models, that is, to formal models that state what are the ideal judgments. When a situation falls in the domain of validity of a formal model, that is, if the axioms of a normative theory are verified in the situation, this theory can be interpreted as a normative framework: an ideal rater would be supposed to behave accordingly. When actual judgments do not conform to those norms, being able to compare how judgments are built with what they should be may help developing prescriptions for improving performance, building efficient tutorials, and so on. The present article investigates the descriptive power of a normative framework: Possibility Theory.
Uncertainty is at the heart of crucial decision-making processes such as medical diagnosis. Due to various reasons, the modeling of human processes for uncertainty handling has traditionally been approached from a probabilistic standpoint: human performance was compared to probabilistic prescriptions and any divergence was interpreted as a deviation from the optimal behavior. In the same line, subjective estimates of confidence were often called "subjective probabilities" by psychologists. For example, Eddy stated that physicians "can have degrees of certainty about the patient's condition… We can associate a probability, the physician's subjective probability that the patient has cancer, with this degree of certainty" ( [12] , p. 251). Probability, as a normative framework, however, might not always be applicable to situations that humans face. Thus, there is no reason, in the general case, to believe that human judgments of uncertainty must be probabilities. As Shafer remarked, generally, the objective probabilities associated with possible events are not known, and "if we know the chances, then we will surely adopt them as our degrees of belief. But if we do not know the chances, then it will be an extraordinary coincidence for our degrees of belief to be equal to them." ([23] , p. 16). The need for alternative approaches has been advocated in the psychology literature (e.g., [15] ), but few studies actually tackled this question. The present paper reports experimental evidence supporting that Possibility Theory (Zadeh [36] ; Dubois and Prade [8] ) might be a better framework for human uncertainty than Probability Theory, and that "subjective probabilities 2 " could advantageously be renamed "subjective possibilities".
To begin with, some data against the framework of Probability Theory are recalled. Then, reasons are given why Possibility Theory might be a suitable candidate as a normative framework for human uncertainty. Finally several experiments are reported, which test directly if human processing of uncertainty conforms better to Probability Theory or to Possibility Theory prescriptions.
Problems with the probabilistic approach to human uncertainty
When compared to the probabilistic norm, confidence judgments are subject to internal and external consistency problems. Some examples are presented here but for a more extensive review, see Wright and Ayton [34] . A large number of studies have found effects showing that subjective estimates do not conform to the requirements of probability theory, including conjunction and disjunction effects (Barclay and Beach [5] ; Bar-Hillel [4] ; Wyer [35] ; Tversky and Kahneman, [16] [26] , [27] ). Overall those results strongly suggest that it is possible to induce strong violations of rationality. In a typical example of the very robust conjunction effect, experimenters obtained ratings in which the probability that a young woman, Linda, was feminist AND bank teller was higher than the probability that Linda was bank teller alone. Such violations are compatible with no normative theory of uncertainty. Although a lot of studies were devoted to this effect, the question of the rationality of this behavior is not closed. For example, it is still possible that subjects in these experiments actually conformed to conversational rules (e.g., Adler, [1] ; Dulany and Hilton, [11] ). In other studies, about revision in a Bayesian approach, some experimenters obtained "conservatism" (Edwards, [13] ), that is, a too important weight given to the prior probability (the base-rate). To the contrary, other experimenters could produce base-rate neglect (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, [26] ). In addition, physicians' estimates are modified by contextual effects such as severity of symptoms and personal experience (Weber and Hilton, [32] ; Weber, Böckenholt, Hilton, and Wallace [33] ). Also, subjective probabilities are often poorly calibrated (e.g. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, [18] ), that is, experimenters could find systematic distortions between objective and subjective probabilities of real life events (but see Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting [15] ). In Zimmer's work [37] , however, students appeared to be well calibrated when "objective probabilities" were plotted against the median value of the possibility functions representing the meaning of verbal markers.
Beside systematic biases, some researchers questioned the relevancy of probability as a normative framework for human handling of uncertainty. First, information about uncertainty is conveyed through language and thus might be qualitative in essence, rather than numerical. Hence, several works investigated peculiarities in the human processing of linguistically conveyed uncertainty (e.g., [29] , [31] ). Some of them used fuzzy set concepts to parallel numerical and linguistic uncertainty (e.g., [21] ). At first, some authors argued that confidence about a single event (e.g., whether or not a given answer is currently correct) cannot be represented by a probability because probabilities are designed to describe uncertainty in the long run, not single events. In this line of thought, no statement about confidences that are related to single events can violate probability theory [15] . The probabilistic framework is also weak for describing partial ignorance, that is, cases where uncertainty about an event is poorly correlated with uncertainty about the opposite event [8] . In Probability Theory, knowledge about A is expressed as p(A), which is directly related to p(¬A):
Hence, probabilities hardly describe cases where subjects have little or no information about A, so that A is fully possible while ¬A is also possible. In addition, if we ignore p(A) and p(B) but we know that p(A∨B) = ½, and if A and B are independent, the probabilistic framework requires that p(A)=p(B)= ¼. In fact, this indifference principle does not represent ignorance but rather the implicit assumption that A and B have the same prior probability, which is also questionable (e.g., [23] ). In order to represent partial ignorance, all non-standard formal theories of uncertainty share a major property that does not exist in standard probability theory: they represent uncertainty by means of two measures (e.g., Dubois and Prade [8] ; Kyburg, [17] ; Shafer, [23] ). The lower functions exhibit "subadditivity", that is, the fact that lower measures for complementary events generally do not sum up to 1. To the contrary, the upper functions exhibit "superadditivity", that is, the fact that upper measures for complementary events generally sum above 1. Interestingly, those properties can be matched with a psychological finding about human judgment: Ayton [3] reports some studies of in which subadditivity held, and other studies in which superadditivity held. A natural explanation for these apparently discrepant findings could be that humans process uncertainty by mean of two estimates, just like non standard approaches do. Since the ability to represent optimally partial ignorance is a very desirable property for a biological cognitive system, it would not be surprising for human uncertainty to fit better non standard approaches than standard Probability Theory.
The main reason why Possibility Theory is a good candidate
The arguments against standard Probability Theory as the best normative framework for human uncertainty do not necessarily discard other -non standard, frameworks 3 . In our view, the main argument that favors Possibility Theory over other non standard frameworks (and over standard Probability 3 Indeed, standard probabilities are not necessarily completely inadequate (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby, [6] ). Furthermore, Probability Theory and Possibility Theory are not completely independent. Zadeh [36] provided a possibility/probability consistency principle, and there are rules for going from possibility to probability and from probability to possibility (Dubois, Prade, and Sandri [10] ). Theory) is bound to the fact that uncertainty in human affairs often requires pure qualitative, ordinal handling. This is the reason why a purely psychological theory (i.e., a descriptive but not normative theory) like the Semantic Theory of Evidence (Miyamoto et al., [19] ) claims to work on ordinal support functions. Another descriptive psychological theory, Support Theory, (Tversky and Koehler [28] ) also embeds an ordinal extension. Interestingly, in a test of Support Theory, Ayton [3] found that subadditivity of subjective probabilities could be explained if they were, in fact, not additive.
From a psychological standpoint, both Probability Theory and Shafer's mathematical Theory of Evidence are plagued by the problem of ordinal uncertainty because these theories are numeric in nature and do not hold for such things as verbally expressed uncertainty. To the contrary, even if Possibility Theory exists in a numerical version, as a particular case of Shafer's Theory of Evidence, it also holds by itself for qualitative uncertainty, that is, in cases where a numerical treatment of uncertainty is not appropriate (i.e., for non-additive estimates). We shall now present Possibility Theory in its ordinal version, initially proposed in Zadeh [36] , and developed by Dubois and Prade (e.g., [8] ).
Comparison of possibility and probability measures
Let X be an ill-known variable, say, the actual disease of a patient, and Ω X , the set of all values ω that X can take on. For instance, Ω X could include all plausible diseases, given the diagnostician's medical knowledge, and given the data from an x-ray. ω would be a particular diagnostic hypothesis. Zadeh [36] defined a "possibility distribution" π x (ω): Ω -> [0, 1] which expresses the extent to which it is possible that the actual value of X be ω (e.g., X is the "Tom's disease", ω is "collapsed lung", π x (ω) is the degree to which it is possible that Tom has a "collapsed lung"). This definition holds true for the range [0, 1] taken as a set of ordinal (or numerical) values. Now, if A is an event (i.e., a subset of Ω), Zadeh [36] defines the "possibility measure" that A be correct as Π(A)=sup ω∈A π x (ω). In other words, Π(A) expresses the degree to which A is consistent with all available information about the possible values of X. If A is a diagnosis, the relationship may be interpreted as the level of possibility that the patient has one of the variants of the diseases associated with A. First, we have Π(Ω) = 1 and Π(Ø) = 0. However, those relationships are not specific to a particular way of modeling uncertainty (e.g., with probabilities, we also have p(Ω) = 1 and p(Ø) = 0). A characteristic property of possibility measures is their "max-decomposability": the possibility that a patient has at least one of two diseases A or B, is equal to the possibility value of the "most possible" of the two:
In contrast, probabilities are additive:
Duality was introduced in Possibility Theory by Dubois and Prade [7] . The dual measure of possibility is necessity (denoted N since [8] )
Also, in the general case we have
which expresses the intuitive fact that something must be possible to some extent before it can begin to be certain. Actually, Possibility specifies relationships between Π and N in a more precise manner: Π(A) = 1 if N(A) > 0 and N(A) = 0 if Π(A) < 1. This can be rewritten in a single rule
that is, Π(A) should never be lower than 1 when N(A) > 0.
The dual relation of max-decomposability of possibility is "mindecomposability of necessity":
Another property that distinguishes possibility and probability measures is the relation between the measures associated with complementary events A and ¬A. The probabilistic relation is (1) . As such, the relationship between p(A) and p(¬A) is fully determined. By contrast, Π(A) and Π(¬A) are weakly dependent in real life situations like medical diagnosis. For instance, given a particular piece of evidence, A can be fully possible and ¬A can be somewhat possible at the same time. This is why only an inequality stands:
(8) can be called the "superadditivity" of possibility measures. Of course, by duality,
(9) can be called the "subadditivity" of necessity measures. The two previous relations show that possibilistic measures express partial ignorance with more flexibility than do probability measures. Now we have the main relationships 4 that are tested in the present paper. It is noteworthy that all those relationships hold true for Possibility Theory in both its numerical and qualitative versions whereas Probability Theory does not work with ordinal measures.
The general method used in the paper consists of building experiments in which participants have to provide uncertainty measures about experimental stimuli that are presented under various forms. Let us denote π and ν respectively the observed possibility and the observed n ecessity that are measured on participants. The question is to test whether the relationships involving π and ν fit the relationships that Possibility Theory prescribes for Π and N.
Statistical techniques are applied to test whether relationships between participants' uncertainty measures conform to predictions. Depending on the experiments, participants were undergraduate students in psychology or experimented radiologists. In the later case, materials were composed with real medical cases.
Experiment I: test of relations (5) and (6) using qualitative scales
Experiment I was intended to check whether subjects use linguistic markers in a way compatible with Possibility Theory. It constitutes a first test of some relations with qualitative scale and psychology students as raters.
Method
Participants. Forty first-year students at the University of Toulouse-II Le Mirail contributed on a voluntary basis. Material. Four arguments (syllogisms), AR 1 to AR 4 , were built so that, depending on the compatibility with students' prior knowledge, subjective degree of belief of the conclusion was varied. Those argument were built in such a way that the credibility of the major premise decreased from AR 1 to AR 4 . In particular, it was assumed that the major premise in AR 1 has no exception and is always true, whereas the one in AR 4 is always wrong. It was also supposed that AR 2 is more plausible than AR 3 . Several studies on reasoning under uncertainty with arguments in the form of modus ponens (e.g., George, [14] ; Politzer and George, [20] ; Stevenson and Over, [25] ) showed a transmission from the credibility attributed to the rule to the credibility of the conclusion. As a consequence, the assumption was made that the credibility of conclusions would vary from AR 1 Procedure. Each participant had to provide a judgment on a 7-point scale ("totally certain that it is true"; "almost certain that is is true", "quite true"; "uncertain"; "quite false"; "almost certain that it is false"; "totally certain that it is false"). Each participant also had to provide two ratings about the conclusion. First, the participant had to rate on a 7-point scale the degree to which the conclusion was possible, then the degree to which the conclusion was certain. For possibility measures, the scale ranged from "It is totally possible that…" to "it is not possible at all that…". For necessity measures, the scale ranged from "It is totally certain that…" to "it is not certain at all that…". Those labels were then encoded as ordinal numbers ranging from 1 ("totally") to 0 ("not at all"). Operational Hypotheses. At a general level, the hypothesis was that participants' estimates would conform to (5) and (6) . Let us denote π (ARi) and ν (ARi) respectively the estimates provided by participants for possibility and necessity measures associated with the i th syllogism. In addition to (5) and (6), and because we expect syllogisms to induce decreasing confidence from certainty in AR 1 to total disbelief in AR 4 , we can make the following predictions:
With regard to AR 1 and AR 4 , relations come from the fact that ratings can not go above 1 or below 0 and then π and ν can be expected to converge near certainty and near disbelief: the difference between them should fade and they should exhibit a significant correlation (which actually would be an artifact of the limits). To the contrary, in AR 2 and AR 3 , ratings should be far from the limits and therefore π and ν should be uncorrelated while the difference between them should become significant. Because data are fundamentally ordinal, analyses were made by mean of nonparametric correlations (Spearman' Rho) and Wilcoxon tests ( [24] ).
Results
Overall, 26 participants out of 40 never violated (5) . Twelve violated it on one of the four syllogisms. One violated it on three syllogisms and one on all syllogisms. With regard to (6) results are opposite: only 3 participants never violated it. AR 1 : The spearman correlation between π (AR1) and ν (AR1) was positive and significant ( ρ (40) = .524; p = .001). The Wilcoxon test could not reveal a difference between the levels reached by π (AR1) and ν (AR1) (Z (39) = -0.36; non significant). More than half of the responses for π (AR1) and ν (AR1) were equal to 1 (22 out of 40 for π and 29 out of 40 for ν). Nevertheless, 17 participants out of 40 violated (6) and 9 participants violated (5).
The spearman correlation between π (AR2) and ν (AR2) was not significant. The Wilcoxon test showed that π (AR2) was generally greater that ν (AR2) (Z (39) = -.425; p < .001). Only 2 participants out of 40 violated ( 5) but 20 participants violated (6) .
The spearman correlation between π (AR3) and ν (AR3) was not significant. The Wilcoxon test showed that π (AR1) was generally greater that ν (AR1) (Z (39) = -.425; p < .001). Only 2 participants out of 40 violated ( 5) but 20 participants violated (6).
AR 4 : The spearman correlation between π (AR4) and ν (AR4) was positive and significant ( ρ (40) = .621; p < .001). The Wilcoxon test could not reveal a difference between the levels reached by π (AR4) and ν (AR4) (Z (39) = -1.67; non significant). More than half of the responses for π (AR1) and ν (AR1) were equal to 1 (22 out of 40 for π and 29 out of 40 for ν). Only 4 participants out of 40 violated (5) but 17 participants violated (6) .
Discussion
When considering the well-known randomness associated with human estimates, results are clearly in agreement with (5) . In addition they suggest that π and ν are not correlated unless they both tend to one of the limits (0 or 1). This is in agreement with Possibility Theory. However, it is not possible to defend that (6) holds strictly. Nevertheless, a simple explanation can reasonably by proposed for this lack of fit. It is based on the notion of strategic prudence. When considering a sample of human persons, many will strategically try to avoid extreme opinions and extreme ratings. This kind of behavior has an important value for social life but it makes difficult the direct testing of (6) because this relation requires the systematic production of extreme values: at any moment, at least one of the two measures must have an extreme value. Because of such "prudence bias", it can be expected that average judgments will be contained within an interval [ε 0 , 1-ε 1 ] (instead of [0, 1]), with ε 0 and ε 1 being not known a priori. On the whole, participants exhibited an intuitive comprehension of the linguistic markers for possibility and necessity. This comprehension was roughly conformed to Possibility Theory prescriptions.
Experiment II: test of (4), (5), (6), (8), (9) using numerical scales.
The first experiment made use of qualitative scales. Relations might be different if participants were offered analogical scale providing numerical values. In addition, raters in experiment I were students. One might argue that with experts who are trained to deal with uncertainty, things would be different. Thus, the second experiment extended the initial test by introducing numerical scales, it tested more relationships and raters were experimented radiologists.
Method
Participants. Four radiologists volunteered. They had professional experiences ranging from 8 to 17 years after the end of internship (mean experience: 12.0 years). Material. Twenty-eight digitized images from 28 patients were shown on a PC computer screen. Two were used for familiarisation with the task. The radiologists independently reviewed the films. No clinical history was provided. All of the films were from patients with an actual pathology and participants were told that no film was normal. Procedure. For each case, the radiologists triggered the viewing of the films. They could explore the picture as long as needed. Then they clicked on a button to start the question answering, at which point the image was deleted from the screen, and the subject answered from memory. The first question asked the subject to type two diagnoses (no more and no less). Then came questions about the radiologist's confidence judgments in the hypotheses he or she had. Suppose the participant typed "Atelectasis" then "Pleural effusion". To get confidence judgments, the computer generated questions about those diagnoses:
For π(X): To what degree is it possible that the diagnosis Atelectasis is right ?
To what degree is it certain that the diagnosis Atelectasis is right ? For π (¬X): To what degree is it possible that the diagnosis Atelectasis is wrong ? All of the participant's diagnoses received confidence judgments, expressed using a cursor that slid from "Not possible at all" to "Totally possible" for possibility judgments, and from "Not certain at all" to "Totally certain" for necessity judgments. The cursor returned a value on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. T hese values were used directly as confidence judgments. Therefore, in all expected relationships, 1 must be replaced by 100. Analysis: Differences were tested using standard t tests. Equalities were first tested through Pearson correlations and t-tests of the mean difference, which had to be nonsignificant. Indeed, finding a nonsignificant difference does not allow to assert that the difference is small enough to be negligible, as is required to test experimentally an equality. Thus, we also used a "Bayesian inference" procedure (Rouanet [22] ). Such a procedure is complementary to traditional frequentist inference and computes the guarantee γ a researcher has when asserting the smallness (or largeness) of an effect. According to Rouanet (1996) , a standardized effect |δ cal | < .4 can be deemed small. A reasonable guarantee is γ = p( |δ cal | < .4) ≥ .9 (rather than the complementary values of the familiar α levels) because "assessing importance is a more demanding task than significance" ( [22] , p. 151).
Results
The hypothesis that was judged to be the most plausible is noted X. With regard to duality (4), the predicted correlations were obtained. The expected positive correlations between ν(X) and 100-π(¬X) were high and significant (r (103) = .71, p <.0005) as were the correlations between ν(¬X) and 100-π(X) ( r (103) = .69, p < .0005). As expected, we found a weak mean difference that was not significant ( m d = 2,01; t (103) = 1.49, p = .138). Furthermore, using Bayesian inference, γ = p(|δ cal | < .376) = .99 and, because γ > .90, not only was the difference non significant but equality could be positively assumed with a reasonable guarantee. The second equality, ν(¬X) = 100-π(X), however, was not as good: although the mean difference was weak (m d = 3.75), it was significant (t (103) = 3.24, p = .002).
Participants conformed well to (5): with a paired Student's t-test, π(X) was significantly greater than ν(X) (83.2 vs. 76.3 respectively; mean difference: 7.0; t (103) = 6.04; p < .0005).
Participants did not satisfy (6) at all: If these rules had been satisfied, we would have found few if any cases such that π(A)<100 while ν(A)>0. But in 96 cases out of 104, the radiologists indicated ν(A)>0 and π(A) < 100 (z (103) = 5.47, p < .0001).
Superadditivity of the possibility functions (8) worked well, with the mean sum π(X) + π(¬X) ≈ 108.9 > 100 (t (103) = 5.87; p < .0005).
Subadditivity of necessity functions (9) also worked well, with the mean sum ν(X) + ν(¬X) ≈ 96.8 < 100 (t (103) = -2.56; p = .006).
Discussion
Overall, results support some important properties of Possibility Theory, duality in particular. Subadditivity of necessity measures and superadditivity of possibility measures are important because they are not compatible with a standard probabilistic interpretation of human confidence judgments. Yet it is still compatible with some other non standard additive models such as belief functions and plausibility functions ( [23] ). Also, there was clearly a problem with (6) . In the following section, we argue that it is a methodological artifact and we propose a technical solution.
Building a new measure of uncertainty: the Ψ-scale
Probability Theory uses one measure of uncertainty whereas Possibility Theory uses two measures. This raises a new question: How can we build an apparatus for comparing human performance with both frameworks? Ideally, such an apparatus will enable raters to provide their estimates in one measure so that extra-vagueness would not be added to spontaneous confidence judgments. At the same time this measurement apparatus must enable the experimenter to compute both possibility and necessity measures from a participant's rating. Moreover, possibility and necessity measures are compatible with Possibility Theory only if something is fully possible before being somewhat certain. This condition was not fully fulfilled in Experiments I and II. As mentioned earlier, it might be due to considerations that are not relevant to formal aspects of theories, like the desire to avoid extreme opinions. Hence, we can try to get uncertainty measures that would be less subject to those biases. For this purpose, it is noteworthy that if a possibility measure is relevant for testing a given hypothesis (i.e., Π(A) < 1), then asking for a necessity measure is not relevant (i.e., it provides no new information since N(A) is necessarily equal to 0). Reciprocally, if a necessity measure is appropriate (i.e., N(A) > 0), then asking a possibility measure is not relevant (since Π(A) is necessarily equal to 1). So, is there a way to produce proper possibilistic measures from the participant's estimates? We propose the following solution: participants are given a choice between a possibility and a necessity measure. They produce confidence judgments using only one of the two scales, and the software forces the value for the other scale. Participants are informed that the two scales are related, so they can choose a scale with full knowledge of the consequences on the other. Now, how can we compare such measures with a subjective probability measure that is single by nature? Didier Dubois (personal communication) proposed using a single scale combining both possibility and necessity measures and ranging from "totally impossible" to "totally certain". Henceforth, we shall call "Ψ-scale" the scale where possibility and necessity measures are averaged into a "Ψ-measure",
Ψ(h)=½[Π(h)+N(h)]
Reciprocally, after measuring a confidence degree with a single measure, as it is usually done, one can reconstruct both Π and N from this measure:
This apparatus has the advantage of enabling a comparison of the possibility and probability frameworks because one can either directly use the Ψ-measure as a subjective probability measure, or split the Ψ-measure into a possibility and a necessity measures. Incidentally, the reader can easily check from (10) that, just like a probability, the Ψ-scale is auto-dual:
In Possibility Theory, total uncertainty is the conjunction of Π(h) = 1 and N(h) = 0, that is, "everything is possible and nothing is certain". Therefore, with a Ψ-scale, total ignorance is denoted Ψ(h) = ½. The present article tested whether human processing of uncertainty conforms to Possibility Theory, which would lead to the reinterpretation of "subjective probabilities" as "subjective possibilities", in line with Zadeh proposal [36] . If such an interpretation is correct, we should be able to equate Ψ-measures with direct subjective probabilities. The following experiment used the Ψ-scale apparatus.
Experiment III: test of disjunction of confidence judgments
This experiment was designed (a) to test whether Ψ-scale measures can be used as direct subjective probability measures; (b) to test some basic assumptions of Possibility Theory, and particularly Max-decomposability of possibility measures (2) vs. the probabilistic model of disjunction (3). The experiment enabled replication, using Ψ-measures, of a successful result obtained in experiment II, that is, duality (4). Auto-duality of Ψ-measures (12) was also tested. The experiment used a series of measures. First, a measure was taken using the Ψ-scale (Figure 1) and was compared to a direct measure of subjective probability (raters were explicitly asked to provide a probability, Figure 2 ).
Figure 1 : The Ψ-scale measurement apparatus
The scale is composed of two dissociated sliders. The initial position is as shown on the picture : everything is possible, nothing is certain.
The second part consisted in using the Ψ-measures to compute the models to be tested. For probabilistic models, the probability measures were directly given by the Ψ-scale. For possibilistic models, possibility and necessity measures were computed from the Ψ-scale. Finally, values computed from the model were compared to directly measured values.
Figure 2 : The direct probability measurement apparatus
Let us denote Ψ(.) the direct Ψ-measure; π(.) and ν(.) the measures of possibility and necessity respectively derived from Ψ(.) using (11); Π(.) and N(.) are the possibilistic models. As an example, suppose a participant provided Max(π(A), π(B) ). Then, we can compare how Π(A∨B), the possibilistic model for disjunction, fits π(A∨B), the observed value for disjunction. Ultimately, we can test which model of disjunction fits data the best.
Ψ(A); Ψ(B), Ψ(A∨B), where A and B are two diagnostic hypotheses. Applying (11) to Ψ(A), Ψ(B), and Ψ(A∨B), respectively, we get π(A), π(B), and π(A∨B).

Now, applying (2), we get Π(A∨B) =
Method
Participants. The participants were four radiologists with professional experience ranging from 6 to 17 years after the end of internship (mean experience: 10.5 years). Material. Twenty-five digitized images from 25 patients were shown. One film was used for familiarization with the task. In order to test the predictions of normative theories over a wider range of uncertainty, we manipulated uncertainty: a short clinical history was given, along with two diagnoses that had been chosen on the basis of their compatibility with typical interpretations of the salient cues on the x-rays. The two diagnoses were said to have been made by a first-year novice. We generated three conditions: both diagnoses compatible with the x-ray (CC condition), one compatible diagnosis and one incompatible diagnosis (CN condition), and both diagnoses not very compatible (NN condition). There were 8 films in each condition. The presentation order was randomly determined by the computer. To control for order effects among the cases in the CN condition, four cases had the compatible diagnosis presented first, and four cases had the incompatible diagnosis presented first. The radiologists being tested entered confidence judgments in the computer by means of a custom-designed software tool we developed to implement the Ψ-scale. It consisted of two cursors. The upper cursor was used for the possibility measure and the lower cursor, for the necessity measure. For each rating, the radiologist used only one of the two cursors. Depending on the final locations of the chosen cursor, the program returned a possibility value and a necessity value, both ranging from 0 to 100. Before modification, the scale was set to Π = 1 and N=0 (i.e., "Totally possible" and "Not certain at all"). The answer to the direct probability question was recorded via a single cursor ranging from 0 ("no chance, the probability is null") to 100 ("there is a 100% chance"). Initially, the cursor was set at the midpoint, which was labeled "50% or one chance out of two". Procedure. The radiologists viewed the films independently. Every case was processed as follows. (1) The diagnostician read a short clinical history and the two diagnoses attributed to a first-year novice. He or she triggered the appearance of an image by clicking on a button. When a decision was made, the radiologist clicked a button to start answering questions. This removed the image from the screen and stopped the timer. A series of questions was then presented to the participant. The first question asked the radiologist to enter the proposed diagnoses. Up to four diagnoses could be entered on the same screen, with associated confidence judgments. The radiologist was free to enter the diagnoses in any order. Let us call X the most plausible diagnosis (the one with the highest confidence judgment), and Y the second most plausible. The program identified X and Y (Y, if at least two diagnoses were entered) on the basis of the plausibility measures. The diagnostician was then asked to provide a confidence judgment about the plausibility of X (and Y if there was one) being wrong.
Hereafter, we shall call the novice's first and second diagnoses A and B, respectively. The radiologist was asked to make one confidence judgment for A, one for B, one for the disjunction A∨B, and one for the conjunction A∧B. The final question asked the participant to make a direct probability judgment about whether X was correct. As in Experiment 1, the program generated questions about the diagnoses. Given two diagnosis "Atelectasis" and "pleural effusion", here For direct probability measures: What is the probability that the diagnosis "Atelectasis" is correct ?
Results
Subjective probabilities as subjective possibilities. As expected the correlation between Ψ-measures and direct subjective probabilities was high and positive (r (95) =.61; p<.0005). Furthermore, as expected, there was no significant difference between subjective probability measures and Ψ-measures (t (95) =0.39), and Bayesian inference allows us to claim that the mean difference may be neglected with a comfortable guarantee γ = p(|δ cal | < .366) = .999. Now, to use Ψ-measures as probabilistic measures, it is useful to evaluate the error of the tool. The mean error was less than 1% (mean error = 0.71; S d = 1.80), which is good. Therefore, we can expect the error when using Ψ-measures as subjective probability measures to fall within the interval [-4.3%, +2.9%] in 95% of the observations (m ± 2σ, for observations ranging from 0 to 100). Consequently, it seems legitimate to use Ψ-measures as subjective probabilities. Disjunction. In 12 cases out of 96, the radiologists produced measures that were incompatible with the probabilistic framework because the model led to predicted values below 0 (1 case) or greater than 100 (11 cases). But these measures were still compatible with the possibilistic model. Nevertheless, in order to reinforce the case against Possibility Theory, these cases were excluded from the computation of the fit between the data and the probabilistic model. The results showed that both the probabilistic model and the possibilistic model fit the data. An unpredicted result was the fact that the Max-decomposability model, which was required only for π-measures, also gave a good fit with ν-and Ψ-measures.
Duality. Duality of π and ν measures as well as auto-duality of Ψ-measures were clearly obtained. For one relation, (ν(¬X) = 100 -π(X)), 93 pairs out of 96 were exactly equal, which is remarkable. For the other relations, the correlations ranged from .51 to .79 (n=96, all p s <.0005) and, as expected, the differences were weak and non significant. All but one of the Bayesian guarantees were over .90. In summary, there appears to be a duality between possibility and necessity measures. The direct measures of subjective probabilities were significantly correlated with both the possibility and the necessity measures. After computing Ψ-measures from possibility and necessity measures, the Ψ-measures appeared to be strongly correlated with the direct subjective probabilities. The accuracy of the fit between the Ψ-measures and the direct subjective probabilities was better than 5%, allowing us to interpret Ψ-measures as subjective probabilities. Max-decomposability of Ψ-measures fit the data despite the fact that we only expected this for possibility measures. Overall, the possibilistic model fitted the data well, actually better than the probabilistic model which was not compatible with some of the data. 
Models of Disjunction
Experiment IV: test of conjunction of confidence judgments
In Experiment III, we did not distinguish between cases where elementary events were independent from cases where they were dependent. Therefore, we could not formally test conjunction, because the two conditions require different computations. Experiment IV was designed to replicate previous results and to extend the testing of combinatorial properties to conjunction.
As in the previous experiment, let us denote Ψ(.) the direct confidence degree measured using the Ψ-scale, π(.) and ν(.) the observed possibility and necessity measures derived from Ψ(.), Π(.), N(.), the possibilistic models and p(.) the probabilistic models.
Disjunction models were computed in the same way as in the previous experiment, because disjunction is not sensitive to the dependency of elementary events.
In the independent condition, the conjunction was computed using 
Method
Participants. The participants were four radiologists with professional experience ranging from 6 to 17 years after the end of internship (mean experience: 10.5 years).
Material. The method was similar to that used in the previous experiment. In addition, two conditions were generated: in the independent condition (12 x-rays), the diagnoses of the novice were independent. X-rays were chosen so as to show two different sets of clues, each one leading to a specific kind of diagnosis. In the dependent condition (12 x-rays), the x-rays and proposed diagnoses were chosen in such way that the two diagnoses were either mutually exclusive (6 x-rays) or mutually consistent (6 x-rays). In the mutually exclusive condition, the diagnoses were chosen so that if one of them accounted for the data, the other had no reason to be correct. In contrast, mutually consistent diagnoses were chosen so that if one was correct, the other was also probably correct.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment III, but the duality and direct subjective probability questions were replaced by conditional questions (A|B) and (B|A). For instance, if A was atelectasis, and B, pleural effusion (two conflicting diagnoses), Ψ(A|B) was asked by means of a question like "Assuming that the diagnosis pleural effusion is correct, then to what extent does it seem plausible to you that the diagnosis atelectasis is correct?"
Results
Disjunction. In 19 cases out of 96, the radiologists produced measures that were incompatible with the probabilistic framework (although compatible with the possibilistic one) because the probabilistic model led to predicted values below 0 (1 case) or greater than 100 (18 cases). These cases were eliminated from the computation of the fit between the data and the probabilistic model. Nevertheless, the results showed that the possibilistic model fitted the data better than the probabilistic one because the difference between the model and the data was non-significant with possibilities whereas it was significant with probabilities. As in the previous experiment, we found an even better fit when Max-decomposability was applied to the Ψ-values. Thus, with regard to disjunction, the results of this experiment replicated the results of Experiment 2 (see Table 2 ). Table 2 : Comparison of observed possibility disjunctions with both possibilistic and probabilistic predictions *Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible. ** "undetermined effect": negligibility cannot be claimed Conjunction. In the independent condition, the data fit was better with the possibilistic model than with the probabilistic one (see Table 3 ) because the difference between the data and the latter model was significant. In addition, Bayesian inference allowed us to claim negligibility of the difference between data and the possibilistic model, but not between data and the probabilistic model. Surprisingly, the best fit appeared with possibility measures (r(46) = .928; mean difference < 0.4%). This could be due to the fact that in the part of the scale where most conjunction ratings were (below 50), possibility measures are more relevant than necessity measures. *Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible. ** "undetermined effect": negligibility cannot be claimed.
Models of Disjunction
Models of Conjunction
In the dependent condition, no model fit the data because the differences between the data and both the possibilistic and the probabilistic models were highly significant. The observed data were largely below the predicted values (the lowest mean difference was 20 and all ps ≤. 001). Hence, both models should be rejected in the dependent condition. Quite surprisingly, if we try to apply the models of the independent condition to the dependent condition data, we find that these "simplified models" fit the data reasonably well (see Table 4 ). Table 4 : Comparison of conjunction models with data (dependence condition treated with independence condition models).
*Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible. ** This correlation seems stronger than the others, but when the possibilistic model was computed on the restricted subset of cases where the data did not lead to rejection of the probabilistic model, the correlation was comparable (r(35) = .89; p<.0005). *** "undetermined effect": negligibility cannot be claimed.
Thus, radiologists appeared to treat conjunction in the dependent condition as if the elementary events were independent. In fact, such a claim would be overly strong because spontaneous verbal reports showed that participants treated incompatible events as completely exclusive and gave a zero value for the conjunction, even if the two elementary confidence judgments were above zero. If we distinguish between cases where elementary events tended to be mutually exclusive and cases where they were consistent, we find that the correlations between the models and the data were good for consistent events (ranging from r (23) =.74, p<.0005 one-tailed to r (23) =.87, p<.0005) whereas they were low for mutually exclusive events (ranging from r (23) =.236, p=.053 one-tailed to r (23) =.53, p=.004). If we apply the comparison of possibilistic vs. probabilistic frameworks with the simplified models (processing dependent conjuncts as if they were either independent or totally exclusive), the possibilistic model appears to be better because there is a clearly significant difference between the probabilistic calculus and the data, whereas the possibilistic calculus fits the data well.
Discussion
Results obtained in Experiment IV replicated and extended those found in Experiment III. For disjunction, possibilistic models were better because the absolute values of the data differed significantly from the probabilistic model and did not differ significantly from the possibilistic model. The results for conjunction were more contrasted: in the independent condition, the possibilistic outperformed the probabilistic one, but in the dependent condition, neither was satisfactory. Nevertheless, from these results, we can propose a new hypothesis about the combinatorial algorithm humans use for conjunctions: for independent and consistent events, a min-rule is applied. For mutually exclusive events, participants either attribute a zero value or use the min-rule. We call this algorithm "satisficing conjunction". It would be interesting to go back to the results of Experiment III and test whether such a result could also be found. In Experiment III, we did not have the data for distinguishing dependent and independent conditions (i.e., Ψ(A|B) and Ψ(B|A)), so conjunction could not be tested formally. However, we can test whether satisficing conjunction fits the Experiment 2 data. As Table 5 shows, both the probabilistic and possibilistic models of satisficing conjunction fit the data of Experiment II, but as in Experiment III, the possibilistic model was better because only the difference between the data and the probabilistic model was significant. If we test the probabilistic model without the cases that led the predicted disjunction to inconsistent values, the difference is even more striking (mean difference = 5.5, t (83) = 4.33, p < .001, two-tailed). *Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible. ** This correlation is stronger than the others, but when the possibilistic model was computed on the restricted subset of cases where the data did not lead to rejection of the probabilistic model, the correlation was comparable (r (76) = .921; p<.0005). ** "undetermined effect": negligibility cannot be claimed.
Models of Conjunction
Summary and general discussion
In four experiments, we tested whether Possibility Theory describes intraindividual human judgments of uncertainty, and particularly whether it describes human judgments better than probability theory does. This article does not address the question of the combinatorial rules an experimenter should use when combining judgments from different raters. Nor does it address the question of calibration of confidence judgments, that is, whether subjective probabilities fit objective probabilities measured in the real world. None of the participants was instructed in Possibility Theory. Most of them had received a formal training in probabilities at some moment. Therefore, if their reasoning and judgments were biased by theoretical knowledge, it should have favor Probability Theory.
Unlike most experiments in psychology, participants of Experiments I and II could rate uncertainty by mean of two direct measures, a "subjective possibility" and a "subjective necessity". In such case, we could observe that the possibility measure was generally lower than the necessity measure. More interesting, those values respected a duality relationship, Π(A) = 1 -N(¬A), which is compatible with Possibility Theory, but which cannot be predicted from Probability Theory. In addition, possibilities were generally superadditive (Π(A) + Π(¬A) > 1) and necessities were generally subadditive (N(A) + N(¬A) < 1). This finding is predicted by Possibility Theory but is not compatible with standard Probability Theory. Nevertheless, in many cases, Π(A) and N(A) were both greater than zero, with Π(A) < 1. This is not compatible with Possibility Theory. Now, it can be remarked that for any rating, only one measure of uncertainty is sufficient in Possibility Theory: if N(A)>1 then Π(A) must be 1. Therefore in such a case, Π is not relevant. Reciprocally, if Π(A)<1 then N(A) is necessarily equal to zero. Therefore N(A) is not relevant in this case. Based on the idea that asking two measures when one is sufficient might bias behaviors, we built a new apparatus called Ψ-scale. This apparatus enables the rater to choose the single measure (possibility or necessity) that appears relevant, and to give an answer on the corresponding cursor. The non relevant measure (N or Π) is given its default value (0 for N and 1 for Π) . The Ψ-measure is computed by averaging the possibility and necessity given by the Ψ-scale. A first important result is that whatever the apparatus used (a "Ψ-measure" or a regular "subjective probability" measure -as usual in Psychology), those ratings were approximately equal. The second important result is that the finding about duality was replicated in Experiment III and IV, which used Ψ-scale: the relationship Π(A) = 1 -N(¬A) was well verified in all four experiments, which is not a trivial prediction. The third important result is that possibilistic models of disjunction fitted the data better than the probabilistic model. In other words, a characteristic axiom of possibility theory (max-decomposability of possibilities) appears to fit human judgment. The forth important result is that the possibilistic model worked well for conjunction, but only when conjuncts were independent. In this case it worked better than the probabilistic (additive) model. When conjuncts were dependent, neither models worked. However, a qualitative heuristic that we called "satisficing conjunction" seemed to be used by participants: For mutually exclusive events, participants either attributed a zero value or used the min-rule. For all other events, they applied a min rule.
A question that we left aside is the randomness inherent to human judgments (e.g., [30] ). This means that when possibility theory expresses a rule as duality (4), a human individual who would follow this rule would actually be better described by a rule like N(A) = 1 -Π(¬A) + e (13) where e is a random noise. It must be clear to the reader that even if a possibilistic combination rule fits the data of our human raters, this is after an averaging procedure that makes this noise tending to zero 6 . Another question that might be raised is about the status of linguistic markers that we used: different people might interpret these terms differently. However we do not think it was really a problem because our results show that, on average, the interpretation that participants made of "possible" and "certain" was roughly compatible with the formal interpretations of those terms. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why duality works very well since it is not at all an intuitive relationship.
All together, those results provide a picture where human handling of uncertainty is made through satisficing algorithms that are qualitative in their essence, and therefore are more compatible with Possibility Theory than with Probability Theory. This is not to say that Probability Theory should be totally abandoned. Some processes in the human cognitive system are extremely well modeled with a Bayesian approach, particularly some automatic and unconscious processes (e.g., [2] ). Nevertheless, applying numerical inference is very demanding at the conscious level and it is very unlikely that a human spontaneously uses such algorithms in daily life situations. To the contrary, Possibility Theory uses only Mix, Max, and order-reversing operations. Those operations are not demanding for the conscious cognitive system and can be used in daily life situations. In addition, the human cognitive system evolved in social-life conditions where an efficient processing of linguistic uncertainty could make a difference (e.g., group hunting). Possibility Theory is particularly well designed for handling linguistic uncertainty since it is able to work in a pure qualitative way. For the moment, however, the study reported here is only a first step toward providing a solid ground for its application. Judgments are one thing, actual decisions another. This is why, for example, experiments in economics are usually about choice. Under the related -but different framework of fuzzy probability models, there have been attempts to go beyond (e.g., [38] ). We choose to start with possibility theory but ultimately, we need to go beyond and test how possibilistic uncertainty combines with utilities. It will now be possible to further investigate this question in the possibilistic framework because the bases for a possibilistic, qualitative, decision theory were recently developed ( [9] ).
Finally, beside principle arguments, the experimental results brought in this paper support that Zadeh [36] was right when he has the intuition that, in human, subjective probabilities were actually subjective possibilities. Indeed, those findings are important for cognitive modelers. Because humans are quite good at handling very complex and ill-defined situations, they should also be of interest for other artificial intelligence researchers.
